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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, while various government bodies
scrambled to address the myriad tragedies and emergencies that arose from the disaster,
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one critical question went largely unanswered and ignored: What was to become of the
historic homes damaged in the storm and ensuing flood?
Obviously this question was of secondary concern at the time—where human life
and safety are imperiled, the primary focus of government officials should be on restoring
order and ensuring their constituents are protected. Precisely because of the existence of
more pressing issues in a time of emergency, therefore, it is important to have a prepared
plan addressing how best to incorporate historic preservation law into recovery and
rebuilding efforts. In many areas, and in New Orleans in particular, historic architecture
and ambience play a large role in forming the identity of the community; if a community
is rebuilt without its identity in mind, its residents will not truly be able to return home.
In this paper I will discuss in more detail why a system for addressing historic
preservation concerns in a time of emergency is necessary and what that system should
entail. Part I includes a description of New Orleans, how the New Orleans historic
preservation statute functions, and what the results were in historic districts affected by
Hurricane Katrina. Part II is a brief description of other areas that have experienced
large-scale disasters, with an exploration into how the various responses affected the
goals of historic preservation. Part III details a proposed solution—that emergency
provisions be written into local historic preservation statutes to govern how the statute
will function in a time of emergency, and what those provisions should look like.
Although the typical procedure put in place by the historic preservation ordinance
may not be feasible in a time of emergency, a modified or alternative version of that
process would best protect the interests of preservation while allowing local government
to sufficiently respond to the needs of the community.

3

I. THE NEW ORLEANS EXPERIENCE

New Orleans, Louisiana is a city beloved for its many and varied attributes. It has
a rich, diverse history, a product of its being settled by the French, German, and Spanish,
and later the Americans following the Louisiana Purchase. 1 This unusual pedigree has
created a unique cultural amalgamation that is reflected in the city’s music, food,
lifestyle, and architecture. Each of these categories serves as a draw for the city’s second
largest source of income—tourism. 2 Architectural tourism is so popular in New Orleans,
in fact, that the city’s official tourism site advertises thirteen different tours with a focus
on architecture. 3 The focus of those tours, of course, is the historic buildings, homes, and
plantations of the area, particularly in the French Quarter and the Garden District. 4

A. THE LOCAL PRESERVATION LAWS

The New Orleans historic preservation statute encompasses the regulation of
properties in the historic districts, the formation of the New Orleans Historic District

1

See LYLE SAXON, FABULOUS NEW ORLEANS 74, 94, 140–41, 160 (1947).
See Press Release, New Orleans Tourism Marketing Corporation, Why is New Orleans
Important to America? (Feb. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.neworleansonline.com/pr/pressreleases/pr_whyNOisimportant.pdf.
3
See New Orleans Online, Things to See and Do, Tours,
2

http://www.neworleansonline.com/neworleans/tours/tours.html (last visited Apr.
19, 2005).
4

See id.
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Landmark Commission, and provisions for enforcement of its terms. 5 New Orleans was
among the first cities in the United States to recognize its duty to protect its historical
architecture by enacting preservation legislation. 6 The first step was the creation of a
historic district in the Vieux Carré, the oldest part of the French Quarter, in 1937. 7 The
city enacted a more general statute applicable to the entire municipality in 1976. 8 The
statute functions similarly to many local historic preservation ordinances: 9 within a
historic district, no building may be “erected, altered, restored, moved or demolished”
without a Certificate of Appropriateness, issued by the New Orleans Historic District
Landmarks Commission. 10
The statute specifies what criteria the Commission must take into account in
issuing Certificates of Appropriateness. 11 For new structures, the criteria include visual
compatibility and harmony with the “tout ensemble” of the neighborhood and quality and

5

See generally New Orleans, La. Ordinance No. 5992 M.C.S. (Feb. 19, 1976, revised
Aug. 21, 1980).
6
See KAROLIN FRANK & PATRICIA PETERSEN, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE USA 139
(2002).
7
See JACOB H. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 12 (1974). The Vieux Carré
was created by Ordinance No. 14,538 C.C.S., which was enacted after an amendment to
the Louisiana constitution enabled its establishment. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 22A
(1921); City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dirs. of La. State Museum, 739 So.2d 748, 752 n.6
(La. 1999) (indicating that this amendment was retained by LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17 of
the 1974 constitution).
8
See No. 5992 M.C.S.
9
See, e.g., Pittsburgh, PA Code of Ordinances Tit. 11, § 1101.05 (2006) (requiring a
Certificate of Appropriateness for construction, alternation, removal, or demolition in a
historic district); San Francisco, CA Art. 10, § 1006 (2006) (same); Washington, D.C.
Law 2-144 (2006) (requiring permits for alteration, subdivision, new construction, and
demolition for properties in historic districts, issued by the Mayor on recommendation by
the Historic Preservation Review Board).
10
No. 5992 M.C.S., §VI(A).
11
Id. § VIII.
5

excellence of design. 12 For alterations, the considerations are compatibility with the
surrounding buildings, the original design, the architectural character, and the historical
quality of the building. 13 For demolition, criteria include the building’s historical or
architectural significance, its importance to the “tout ensemble,” its special character and
aesthetic interest, difficulty of reproduction, and the future use of the site. 14
The ordinance calls for the creation of the New Orleans Historic District
Landmarks Commission, which is charged with, among other things, issuing the
Certificates of Appropriateness. 15 The Commission has no more than fifteen members,
and it differs from many other local historic preservation statutes in that there are
relatively few requirements for its membership. 16 The members are appointed by the
Mayor and approved by a majority of the City Council, and each historic district in the
city must be represented by at least one of its residents or property owners. 17 The
Commission operates by holding hearings to gather information on requested Certificates
of Appropriateness and then voting on their issuance. 18
All historic preservation laws are only as good as the strength of their
enforcement. Under the New Orleans ordinance, the Commission has the right to order

12

Id. § VIII(A).
Id. § VIII(B).
14
Id. § VIII(D).
15
Id. § II, VI(A).
16
Many local historic preservation ordinances include requirements that their review
board members of specified professions, including architects, art historians, and
professional preservationists. See, e.g., Minneapolis, MN Code of Ordinances Tit. 23,
Ch. 599-120(c) (2006); Pittsburgh, PA Code of Ordinances Tit. 11, § 1101.07 (2006).
17
Id. § II. There are nine local historic districts in New Orleans. See City of New
Orleans, New Orleans Historic Districts,
13

http://cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=99&tabid=25.
18

Id. § VII.
6

inspections of protected property. 19 If violations are found, the Commission is required
to give the owner notice of the violation. 20 If the violation continues, the Commission
may prosecute, with the required punishment being a fine between fifty and one hundred
dollars for each day the violation continues. 21 The Commission may also request stop
work orders. 22
The one mention of emergency conditions in the New Orleans ordinance is a
section governing condemnation of property. 23 The ordinance provides the following:

Nothing contained herein shall prevent the making of any temporary
construction, reconstruction, demolition or other repairs on a landmark,
landmark site, or building in a district pursuant to the order of any
governmental agency or court for the purpose of remedying emergency
conditions determined to be dangerous to life, health or property. 24

The purpose of this section is to provide a simple solution to individual cases where a
property is in such poor condition that it poses a threat to the community. Although this
provision could be used during a natural disaster or other emergency to suspend the
requirements of the ordinance, it is starkly limited and offers no guidance to government
officials on how to proceed.

19

Id. § XIII.
See id.
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
Minneapolis has a similar, though slightly more extensive and specific provision. See
Minneapolis, MN Code of Ordinances Tit. 23, Ch. 599-50(b); see also Miami Code 236(d) (2006) (allowing suspensions of the usual requirements, but only to the extent
“reasonably necessary to correct the emergency condition); Providence, RI Code of
Ordinances Ch. 27, § 501.11 (2006) (instructing the Historic District Commission to hold
a special meeting with forty-eight hour notice to review emergency applications for
demolition).
24
New Orleans, La. Ordinance No. 5992 M.C.S. § 7(H).
20
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B. THE HOLY CROSS HISTORIC DISTRICT

The historic district of Holy Cross is probably not the first area of New Orleans
that comes to mind when outsiders think of the city’s historic homes. Quite different
from the stately homes of St. Charles Avenue or the emblematic wrought iron balconies
in the French Quarter, Holy Cross is a more humble example of residential, working class
life in New Orleans. 25 The area began as a collection of sugar plantations, which evolved
into small farms that supplied produce locally.26 The population of Holy Cross grew in
the late 1800s, as working-class African-Americans and immigrants moved in looking for
affordable housing. 27 The neighborhood received its name when, in 1859, the Brothers
of the Holy Cross established a school, now called Holy Cross High School, which
remains the only private high school in the area. 28
Holy Cross is an excellent example of the common New Orleans experience in
which homes of a variety of size and expense are grouped together in one
neighborhood. 29 The majority of the structures are in the “shotgun” style, so named
because a bullet shot from the front door would pass through each lined-up door and out

25

See, e.g., John Kessler, Hurricane Katrina: The Aftermath: Sites and Sounds;
Preservationists Fear Bulldozing of Neighborhoods, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 12, 2005,
at 1E.
26
See Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Holy Cross Neighborhood
Snapshot, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/8/20/snapshot.html [hereinafter GNOCDC].
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See id.
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the back. 30 Shotguns are small, one-story homes where the rooms are arranged in single
file, with no hallways. 31
The style was adopted to accommodate the scarcity of land in New Orleans,
where lots were typically thirty-five feet wide. 32 Though the modest wooden structures
were built for typically low to middle income families,33 they are often high in style, with
ornamented facades and porches utilizing columns and the popular local jigsaw
brackets. 34 The shotgun in particular is designed with the New Orleans climate in mind.
They are set two to three feet off the ground on brick pillars and have high ceilings and
large windows to encourage air circulation, preventing mold growth. 35
Other styles represented in Holy Cross are Creole cottages, 36 bungalows, and
brick Italianate homes. 37 The neighborhood also contains more grand architectural
examples—the Jackson Barracks, built in 1834-35, now used as the headquarters of the
Louisiana National Guard, 38 and the two Doullut Steamboat Houses, fanciful homes
inspired by steamboats and the Japanese exhibit at the 1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis. 39

30

See Bywater Neighborhood Association, Shotgun House,
http://bywater.org/Arch/shotgun.htm.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
See S. Frederick Starr, The New Orleans Shotgun: Down but not Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2005, at F7.
35
See id.; Bywater Neighborhood Association supra 30.
36
See, e.g., Bywater Neighborhood Association, Creole Cottage,
http://bywater.org/Arch/Creole.htm. The Creole cottage has a roof ridge parallel to the
street, as opposed to the perpendicular line of the shotgun. Rooms are arranged in the
four-square pattern—two rooms in the front, two in the rear. Id.
37
See GNOCDC, supra note 26.
38
See id.
39
See CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, NEW ORLEANS LAND USE PLAN 195 (1999),
available at
9

It is the more modest homes, however, that are the essence of the community and that
housed some of its more famous inhabitants, including notable jazz musicians. 40
In the mid-twentieth century, Holy Cross began to see the poverty and crime
common to many inner city neighborhoods. 41 In recent years, however, Holy Cross has
seen resurgence. The Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans (PRC) designated
the area a “target neighborhood” in 2002 and has been working to restore its historic
homes since that time. 42 The PRC began a program of purchasing blighted homes,
renovating them, and selling them to first-time homebuyers. 43 Holy Cross also has a
strong neighborhood association, founded in 1981 “to make the neighborhood a safer,
cleaner, and more enjoyable place to live and rear a family.” 44 Although it may once
have been ignored, Holy Cross was entering the twenty-first century with newfound
appreciation and upward momentum.

C. HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE AFTERMATH

https://secure.cityofno.com/Portals/cpc/Land%20Use%20Plan/Land%20Use%20Plan%2
0(text%20only).pdf.
40
See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, 9th Ward: History, Yes, but a Future?, WASH. POST, Oct. 3,
2005, at A1.
41
See, e.g., GNOCDC, supra note 26. Some cite the damage caused by Hurricane Betsy
in 1965 as the beginning of the decline. Id.
42
See Preservation Resource Center, Historic Holy Cross,
http://prcno.org/holy_cross.html.
43
See id.
44
GNOCDC, supra note 26.
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Just after 6:00 a.m. on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Louisiana
coast. 45 Classified as Category Four, 46 the storm was initially thought to have spared
New Orleans the vast amount of predicted damage. 47 The next day, however, two levees
broke and water swept through the city, causing an immensely greater amount of damage
than the storm itself. 48 Bridges and highways became submerged, trapping those who
remained in several feet of infested water and without electricity or means of
communication. 49
The ineptness of the ensuing government response, well documented as it
captured the attention of the nation, 50 took many off guard. Americans were shocked that
their government was so unable to adequately protect its citizens and maintain order.
Perhaps this bitter backlash against the government was in part the reason that city and
federal officials were so eager to begin the recovery and rebuilding process.

1. Damage in Historic Districts Generally

The nine New Orleans historic districts contain 16,000 homes, and of those only
172, or one percent, were deemed destroyed or in imminent danger of collapse after

45

See Joseph B. Treaster & Kate Zernike, Hurricane Katrina: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, at A1.
46
The storm was originally classified as Category Five, the most dangerous level. See id.
47
See id.
48
See Joseph B. Treaster & N.R. Kleinfield, Hurricane Katrina: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2006, at A1.
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., Shaila Dewan et al, Evacuees’ Lives Still Upended Seven Months After
Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 2006, at A1.
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Katrina struck. 51 Another eighty-two were considered damaged but repairable. 52
Although the damage was widespread, some of the oldest parts of the city, including the
French Quarter and the Garden District, were relatively spared from the overwhelming
flooding. 53 Other areas, however, were not as lucky.

2. Damage in Holy Cross

One of the worst hit areas was the Lower Ninth Ward, including the Holy Cross
historic district. 54 Six months after the storm, the area still did not have potable water,
reliable electrical or gas service, or residents—the neighborhood was placed on “look and
leave” status by the city, restricting residents from staying overnight. 55 Homes in the
neighborhood saw up to five feet of flooding, although many of them had some

51

Deon Roberts, Few Homes/Buildings in New Orleans historic districts destroyed by
Hurricane Katrina, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Jan. 16, 2006.
52
Id. There are a number of historic homes in general in New Orleans, those on the
National Register but outside city-designated historic districts, that were destroyed or
seriously damaged—the city designated 5,500 buildings to be demolished, and it is
unknown how many are National Register buildings. See Deon Roberts, Modern Homes
could Replace New Orleans’ Historic Ones, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Jan. 16, 2006.
Although these buildings are of obvious importance to the culture and character of New
Orleans, they are outside the scope of this paper, which focuses only on the New Orleans
historic districts.
53
See, e.g., Catherine Lucey, Normalcy, Not Nudity, is Real Point this Year, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006.
54
The Lower Ninth Ward is one of New Orleans’s lowest neighborhoods and is situated
near the Industrial Canal, part of the levee system that was unable to hold the water from
the storm. See David Klement, Life After Katrina: Destroyed, BRADENTON HERALD
(Florida), March 6, 2006. One report referred to the area as “ground zero” for the levee
break. Robert Behre, After the Storm: 4 Months Later, a City Dries Out, Not Up, POST &
COURIER (Charleston, SC), at A1.
55
See Karen Turni Bazile, Renovations to shotgun homes in Holy Cross, a historic Lower
9th Ward neighborhood, are a source of hope and inspiration, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), March 26, 2006, at 1.
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protection from the water because they were raised from the ground. 56 Although some of
the historic homes were swept off their foundation by the flood 57 and “dried mud cake[d]
everything,” 58 most had little structural damage. 59 The wooden shotgun shacks and
Creole cottages of Holy Cross were constructed mainly with cypress and cedar, which
resist water and rot, and were often made with barge boards—dismantled river barges
that are durable and impermeable to water. 60

3. Response from the City

Under the usual procedure, the Historic District Landmarks Commission (HDLC)
has to approve demolition of buildings in historic districts, even if the city classifies them
as destroyed. If it does so, the owner may request a demolition permit from the city. 61 In
the chaotic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, however, these normal procedures were in
danger of being suspended. Six weeks after the flooding, Mayor Ray Nagin issued an
unsigned proclamation suspending the oversight powers of HDLC. 62 The proclamation,
which would have to be filed in court and with the state to take force, gave the Mayor the
ability “to suspend the provisions of any regulatory ordinance prescribing the procedures

56

Id.
Blair Kamin, A Housing Crisis; The Cultural Stakes Could Not be Higher, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 25, 2005, at C1.
58
Recovery Should Preserve History, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 4, 2005, at
B6.
59
Bazile, supra note 55.
60
See Kessler, supra note 25; Starr, supra note 34.
61
See Roberts, supra note 51.
62
Bruce Eggler & Gordon Russell, N.O. Considers Bypassing Historic Preservation
Law; Mayor’s Proposal Draws Criticism, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 13,
2005, at Metro 1.
57
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for conduct of local business or the orders, rules, or regulation of any local agency” if
those laws caused delays. 63
The release of the proclamation followed the announcement that Mayor Nagin’s
vision for the rebirth of the city was modeled after a “pseudo-suburban” housing
development called River Garden located in the Garden District. 64 The combination of
these two actions led many to assume that entire neighborhoods would be razed to make
room for the new, planned developments. 65 In particular, many feared that the
government would take the opportunity to clear out areas like the Ninth Ward, labeled as
blighted and dangerous, and replace them with a New Urban plan devoid of relevance to
the city and its history.
The result of these alarming reports, combined with the rumors and speculation
they engendered, was uncertainty and confusion. As one National Trust preservationist
put it, “There’s a lot of misinformation. There’s a lot of no information. There’s a lot of
confusion or conflicting information going on. At this point, there’s just a lot of lack of
knowledge.” 66

II. OTHER DISASTERS AND THE RESPONSE OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION

Of course, New Orleans is not the first city with historic buildings to face largescale disaster. An examination of the experiences in other communities shows that,

63

Id.
See Nicolai Ouroussoff, Katrina’s Legacy: Theme Park or Cookie Cutter?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at E1.
65
See id.
66
Behre, supra note 54.
64
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without a pre-determined plan for how to respond to such a crisis, the resulting effects on
historic districts are left largely up to chance. Some cities, like Santa Cruz, California, 67
are unprepared for disaster and unable to save their historic districts. Others, like
Charleston, South Carolina, 68 possess a unique culture allowing for extensive protection
of historic buildings. In neither of those cities, however, was the result dictated by a
planned response built into the local historic preservation statute.

A. EXAMPLE OF FAILURE: EARTHQUAKE IN SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA

The October 17, 1989, Loma Prieta Earthquake garnered much attention for the
damage it caused in the San Francisco Bay area, but the city of Santa Cruz, closest to the
epicenter of the earthquake, was the one of the most devastated by the disaster.69 Before
the earthquake, downtown Santa Cruz was described as a “trendy university town” that
was “a mecca for tourists and free spirits.” 70 The biggest draw was the Pacific Garden
Mall, an area with shops, restaurants, and a collection of Victorian buildings built

67

See infra section IIA.
See infra section IIB.
69
See, e.g., JIM SCHWAB, PLANNING FOR POST-DISASTER RECOVERY AND
RECONSTRUCTION 281 (1998); Miles Corwin, Year After Quake, Rural Areas Still Feel
Impact; Disaster: Santa Cruz and Watsonville Struggle to Find Housing for Thousands
and to Rebuild Businesses, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1990, at A1. Santa Cruz County, in
which the city is located, sustained more damage and destruction to its buildings than
anywhere else affected by the earthquake—loss of life was the only statistic in which
Santa Cruz County was not the leader. See SCHWAB, supra at 283.
70
Tracey Kaplan & Miles Corwin, Santa Cruz Takes Stock of a City Changed Forever,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1989, at A1.
68
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between 1850 and 1910 that served as a gathering place for residents of the city.71 The
historic district was added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1987, with thirtysix of the fifty-four buildings designated as contributing. 72 Pacific Avenue was described
as “lined with gorgeous trees and ornate buildings of Romanesque Revival and
Mediterranean styles.” 73
The 1989 earthquake changed downtown Santa Cruz dramatically. Most of the
Pacific Garden Mall was reduced to rubble, with one report citing eight of the buildings
as “teetering on the brink of collapse” and six others as having major structural damage. 74
Although Santa Cruz had a general emergency management plan, it did not included
provisions to govern recovery. 75 Forty-eight hours after the earthquake, in a rush to
address the immediate needs of the city, the city manager, along with a group of
architects, made the decision to demolish the Cooper House, one of the major landmarks
described as “a cornerstone to the city’s district.” 76 In addition, the St. George Hotel,
“another anchor for the historic district,” was torn down after the city’s inaction and a
“mysterious fire” made restoration impossible. 77 Many of Santa Cruz’s residents and
preservationists were devastated at the loss—as one observer remembered,

71

See, e.g., Kaplan & Corwin, supra note 70; Corwin, supra note 69; Daniel B. Wood,
Santa Cruz Rebounds from Earthquake with Fresh Purpose, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 29, 1993, at 10.
72
See Christopher Elliott, Part of Town’s History Tumbled in Quake; Architecture:
Quaint Santa Cruz Shopping District may Lose its Designation in the National Register
of Historic Places, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at A3.
73
Steve Berg, Solidly on Shaky Ground: Santa Cruz, California has Rebounded from an
Earthquake that Changed its Looks but not its Effervescent Personality, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 25, 1996, at 1G.
74
Kaplan & Corwin, supra note 70.
75
See id. at 281.
76
Elliott, supra note 72.
77
Id.; see also SCHWAB, supra note 69 at 296.
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When the Cooper House was torn down, I cried . . . I went to see because I
couldn’t believe they would do it. When the demolition ball hit the first
few times, it bounced off the building. Everyone cheered. I kept hoping
the building would win against the wrecker’s ball, but they kept chipping
away at it for days, smashing the beautiful sculptures on it, until it was
gone. 78

In 1992, Santa Cruz’s historic district was removed from the National Register of
Historic Places at the recommendation of the State Historical Resources Commission. 79
Only nineteen of the thirty-six listed buildings had survived the earthquake. 80 Although
Santa Cruz has recovered in the seventeen years since the disaster, 81 the rebuilding
process was slow and difficult. The local economy suffered from the drop in tourism,
partly attributed to the loss of its historic district. 82 Many residents look back on the
experience with sadness and regret. One member of the Santa Cruz preservation council
was quoted as saying that they could have saved more if they “had the will.” 83

B. EXAMPLE OF SUCCESS: HURRICANE IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

One month before the Loma Prieta Earthquake, another natural disaster struck a
historic American city, although the lasting results were quite different. On September

78

See Berg, supra note 73.
See Santa Cruz District Loses Historic Status, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 1992, at A16.
80
Id.
81
See Berg, supra note 73.
82
See Wood, supra note 71.
83
Berg, supra note 73.
79
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21, 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the historic southern city of Charleston, South Carolina. 84
With 130 mile-an-hour winds and twenty-foot tidal waves, the storm battered the coast
for three days, inflicting both wind damage and flooding on the city. 85 When the weather
cleared, the city was left with over two billion dollars in damage. 86
Charleston contains one of the country’s oldest and largest historic districts. 87
Established in 1931, 88 the district now contains 4,800 historic buildings. 89 The
contributing structures were built between 1712 and 1945. 90 Though a wide range of
architectural styles is represented, 91 the quintessential Charleston home is the “single
house,” a one-room-wide structure with a wide “piazza,” or porch, on the side to offer
shade and sleeping quarters in hot weather. 92 Many credit Charleston’s large stock of

84

See, e.g., Nancy L. Ross, Rebuilding in Charleston; After the Hurricane, WASH. POST,
June 14, 1990, at T20.
85
See H. Jane Lehman, In Charleston, a Rebuilding Boom, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1991, at
N1.
86
See William A. Davis, Charleston, S.C.—Flowery and Fine Despite Hurricane Hugo,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1990, at B1. After sixteen years, the estimate of total cost to the
city soared to seven billion. See Tom McGhee, Smaller, Stronger City May Rise from the
Much—Vast Undertaking: What Will the New New Orleans Look and Feel Like? The
City’s rebirth is Already Beginning, DENVER POST, Sept. 15, 2005, at A-27.
87
See, e.g., FRANK & PETERSON, supra note 6, at 146.
88
See id. at 147. The Society of the Preservation of Old Dwellings began in Charleston
in 1920 and was later renamed the Preservation Society of Charleston. See id. at 146.
89
See Preservation Society of Charleston, Founding and Preservation Society History,
http://www.perservationsociety.org/who_history.asp.
90
See Preservation Society of Charleston, Preservation Process in Charleston,
http://www.preservationsociety.org/program_process.asp.
91
See id.
92
See Davis, supra note 86. The single house was developed to adapt to the narrow
house lots, so laid out because of the lack of space in Charleston’s original design as a
fortress city. See id.
18

historic buildings as a result of economic depression in the city in the late 1880s when
much of the remodeling would have occurred. 93
Hurricane Hugo caused the collapse of fifty historic buildings and left another 238
with “severe damage.” 94 In the rush to begin rebuilding and debris removal, out-of-town
contractors flooded the city looking for work, many of whom had questionable skill and
training. 95 Instead of blindly allowing homeowners to begin repairs as quickly and
inexpensively as possible, the city’s administration held firm. First, the police set up a
process to deal with the incoming contractors—they were required to register, pay a
license fee, and get fingerprinted to obtain permits. 96
Next, Mayor Joseph Riley refused to waive permits for demolition and repairs,
holding instead to the standards in place before the storm. 97 The Board of Architectural
Review, which reviews request for alterations and demolition of properties in historic
districts, 98 met weekly to study every proposed repair and refused requests to use
twentieth century replacements. 99 In addition, civic groups like the Historic Charleston
Foundation and the Preservation Society of Charleston engaged in massive fundraising 100
and formed groups of volunteers, including architecture and historic preservation faculty
and students, to walk the streets salvaging architectural components from the debris. 101
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Today, many credit Charleston’s almost complete recovery to the resolve of its
leaders and citizens to adhere to preservation ideals instead of settling for a fast
solution. 102 Although residents admit that the process was painful, with critical repairs
put on hold while workers waited for historically appropriate materials, 103 commentators
note that the adherence to strict preservation laws resulted in saving many buildings. 104
Some even cite benefits stemming from the hurricane—a better understanding of
structural integrity in the historic buildings 105 and restoration efforts that would not have
been previously undertaken. 106 The determination by both city leaders and residents 107
not to turn Charleston into “Anyplace, USA,” 108 led to the restoration of a city that is
now “just as nice as what they had.” 109

III. A NEW PROPOSAL: DESIGNING THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE
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See, e.g., Larry Copeland, The Town that Vanished, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2005, at
1A; Davis, supra note 86.
103
See Tara Young, Veterans of Hugo: Drop that crowbar; Group says homes often
worth saving, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 28, 2005, at Metro 1.
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See Lehman, supra note 93.
106
See McGhee, supra note 86. For example, the city began a restoration project on
Market Hall, an 1841 building that was damaged not only by Hurricane Hugo, but also by
years of neglect. See Robert Behre, Market Hall May be the New Standard for
Preservation, POST & COURIER (Charleston), Oct. 13, 2003, at 1B. The restoration
became so extensive, including structural work done to historic specifications that are not
even visible, that the National Trust gave the city its National Preservation Honor Award,
citing the “high standards” and “painstaking attention to detail.” Id.
107
One homeowner went to the lengths of contacting the British National Trust to track
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home was severely damaged was quoted as saying, “I’d get out on the street with a tin
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These examples show the importance of developing a plan for addressing the
needs of historic districts in a time of emergency—such issues should not be left to
chance. Because local governments both bear the brunt of responding in the event of a
disaster 110 and are the primary regulator of historic preservation, 111 the local governments
are themselves in the best position to develop and enact such a plan. It is critical that the
plan be pre-existing, enacted during times of normal operations, so that the community’s
needs can be addressed rationally and without rash impulses.
The following is intended as a guide for a municipality in developing and adding
an Emergency Response provision to their existing historic preservation statute, including
delineation of what law already exists in the area, what considerations local governments
should take into account, and why such a plan is a necessity to every community with
historic districts.

A. THE MODELS ALREADY IN PLACE

Because, as stated above, historic preservation law is left largely to local
municipalities, 112 federal law offers little guidance as to the function of historic
preservation statutes in emergency conditions. Below is a description of the tangentially
relevant portion of the National Historic Preservation Act; in addition, I have included a
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brief discussion of the Model Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance, which includes a
small piece on historic preservation.

1. Section 106

Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act requires any federal agency,
before approving funds for any undertaking, to take into account what effect the
undertaking will have on any site included in or eligible for inclusion in the National
Register. 113 In the case of an emergency or disaster, the result is that agencies like
FEMA must assess the impact of their actions on historic properties before they can act.
Although this provision does offer some protection against hasty action that would
damage historic buildings, section 106 controls only federal action and has no effect on
state or local response.

2. Model Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance

Prepared by the American Planning Association for inclusion in a Planning
Advisory Service Report for FEMA, the Model Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance
is an extensive, comprehensive plan of emergency response to be enacted by local
113

See 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (2000). This section is commonly referred to by its original
public law designation, § 106. The Secretary of the Interior has the authority under 16
U.S.C. § 470(h)-2(2)(j) (2000) to promulgate regulations governing the functioning of the
NHPA “in the event of a natural disaster or imminent threat to the national security.”
The Secretary has done so in 36 C.F.R. § 78 (2006), which in effect suspends the NHPA
upon a finding by a federal agency that the appropriate circumstances exist, but even this
suspension is tempered by § 106. See 36 C.F.R. § 78.1, .3 (2006).
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governments. 114 The Ordinance reaches all aspects of pre- and post-event governmental
action, with a focus on long-term planning options. It includes a short section on historic
buildings, 115 but the Ordinance is limited because it only addresses demolition of
buildings that “represent an imminent hazard to public health and safety” or that “pose an
imminent threat to the public right of way.” 116
The procedure of the Ordinance relies on the supporting structure set up by other
sections, including implementation by a “Director” appointed to run the recovery plan.
The Ordinance also applies to all buildings, with no special procedure or formulation for
those in historic districts. By including a historic preservation section in the Model
Ordinance, the American Planning Association acknowledges the importance of making
these kinds of determinations in advance of a crisis. Although the steps introduced here
are laudable in taking the interests of historic preservation into account, they vest too
much authority to make determinations on demolition in one person, and they are
insufficient to adequately protect historic property.

B. PROPOSED ADDITION TO LOCAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION STATUTES

The experiences of communities that have weathered disasters show that without
a formal procedure in place, the fate of historic districts is left largely to chance. Because
so much authority shifts to the executive branch in times of emergency, the mayor or
other governing official’s personal commitment to preservationist goals becomes the
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determining factor of how many of the city’s historic buildings are saved and how much
effort is put into restoring instead of demolishing.
Historic preservation is about more than aesthetics—it is about preserving the
history of a community, providing and maintaining a sense of place for community
members, and giving people the means to identify with their surroundings and therefore
keep community concerns in mind. 117 Such concerns are too important to be left to the
discretion of a small group of government officials.
It is important, therefore, to establish a procedure, legitimized by the legislative
democratic process, for the demolition of buildings in historic districts during times of
emergency. Such procedure should take into account the time and resource demands that
exist in disaster situations and should therefore be only a truncated or modified version of
the normal process. By establishing this procedure in advance, community leaders can
save the valuable time and effort that goes into arguing about how to proceed, and the
citizens will be assured that their interests are properly planned for and accounted for by
the government.

1. Triggering events

The provision should include a specific designation of what events are required to
trigger the truncated procedure. A practical option is an official declaration of a state of
emergency by the body with the authority to do so, often the mayor of the city or
governor of the state, depending on state law. The modified procedures could be in place
117

See generally Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the
Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981).
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during the duration of the state of emergency, with the normal procedures returning at its
end. The benefits of this option are two-fold: such declarations are designed to be easily
and quickly made by the executive to ensure a flexible and efficient response to
emergency, and the declaration is a clear, definitive government action to use as a
marker. Contrast this option to the emergency provision in the New Orleans statute,
which comes into affect under “emergency conditions determined to be dangerous to life,
health or property.” 118 Such vague and imprecise language creates uncertainty—what is
the measure of such conditions? Who does the measuring? By relying instead on an
official declaration of a state of emergency, which already has established rules and
procedures, 119 such uncertainty is avoided.

2. Modified procedure

Most historic preservation statutes include a thorough, detailed process by which
to determine whether to allow demolition of a building in a historic district. 120 Although
under normal circumstances these procedures are valuable in protecting historic buildings
against rash or uninformed destruction, they are too cumbersome, expensive, and timeconsuming to use during a time of emergency. Multiple levels of inspection, review, and
hearings are often required, which use scarce manpower and other resources.
Applications for demolition are voted on by entire review boards, which may be difficult
to assemble in emergency conditions.
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For these reasons, an expedited process would better serve the needs of a
community facing disaster recovery. Once the emergency provision of the local historic
preservation statute is triggered, a series of modified steps should govern applications for
demolition. First, anyone in the community should have the ability to file the application.
This loosening of the restrictions on filing present in many municipalities 121 will ensure
that in situations where the area has been evacuated, as in New Orleans, and the owners
are not present and are often not even aware of the state of their property, other
government agencies such as city inspectors, FEMA, or the Army Corps of Engineers
have the ability to file the application. If the application is in fact filed by someone other
than the owner of the property, that fact will be taken into consideration in the ultimate
decision of whether to approve the application, but allowing others to file will enable
government officials to take immediate action in demolishing buildings that are
threatening public health and safety.
Second, the requirements for who reviews the application should be less
restrictive. Instead of the usual process, in which the entire review board is to hold a
public hearing and vote on the application, 122 the demolition application should be
reviewed and approved or disapproved by a select group with the experience,
information, and foresight to appropriately make the determination. This group would be
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smaller in number that the typical review board 123 and would be composed of a
predetermined selection of representatives from different professions.
Included in the Emergency Review Board should be an architect, who will be
knowledgeable about both the artistic and historic importance of the building as well as
its construction, a structural engineer, who will be able to assess the damage done to the
building and estimate its stability, an art historian, who could ensure that the pressing
concerns for recovery do not overshadow the importance of restoring historic buildings
when possible, an agent appointed by the mayor’s office, who will be able to represent
the interests and concerns of the executive in organizing the recovery efforts, and a
member-at-large, preferably a resident in the community, who will be able to reflect the
views of the people affected most by the disaster. These individuals need not come from
the normal review board but instead can be chosen by the mayor’s office to reflect the
reality that review board members may not be available during times of emergency. The
reduced size and membership requirements of this board will allow it to be formed and to
meet with more ease than the normal procedures allow, but the requirements for
occupational slots ensure that historic preservation interests will be properly considered
and addressed.
Third, the conditions during a disaster response scenario will probably provide
that a public hearing on the application will not be possible. Instead, the Emergency
Review Board will meet on an ad hoc basis, preferably but not necessarily in a public
setting. The Board will need this flexibility to be able to respond quickly and efficiently
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See, e.g., Houston, Tx. Code of Ordinances Ch. 33-211(a) (2006) (eleven members);
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Ca. Planning Code art. 10, § 1003 (2006) (nine members).
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to demands from others in the recovery effort. Although this process will not be as
transparent as a public hearing, the presence of a community member on the Board will
ensure that the voice of the public is heard. To additionally address this concern, the
application will require unanimous approval of the Board. A unanimous requirement
could possibly slow up the process, as it may be difficult for all of the Board members to
agree, but the small number and lack of visibility of the Board makes such a voting
structure preferable. To solve the potential problem of deadlock, the Board’s decision
should be appealable to an appointed representative in the Mayor’s office. 124
Finally, the criteria the Board should consider in voting on the demolition
application should be modified somewhat to include the concerns created by the
extraordinary conditions. In addition to the criteria included in the ordinary historic
preservation statute, 125 which already address the historic and aesthetic value of the
building, additional criteria should be allowed to weigh in on the Board’s decision.
Initially, the Board should consider the danger to public health and safety posed by the
building, including danger of collapse, as well as unsanitary conditions the building may
be causing. This consideration would ensure that buildings in danger of crumbling near
areas where relief or recovery efforts are underway can be torn down when necessary—
although the Board, under the guidance of the structural engineer, should also thoroughly
examine whether the building could be temporarily braced until more extensive repairs
can be made, so that demolition is not necessary.
124

This type of arrangement where a historic preservation board’s decision can be
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Second, for communities that have been evacuated, the Board should consider
whether a denial of demolition would impede the repopulation of the area. One of the
main sources of concern following Hurricane Katrina was the displaced populace and the
need for residents to return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives. 126 Keeping
repopulation in mind as a high-priority goal, the Board should decide whether allowing
the building to stand would delay this process.
In addition, the Board should consider whether the building can be restored or
temporarily braced given the realities of the emergent circumstances. No doubt, as was
true in New Orleans, resources and manpower will be scarce and severely limited—if
making a building temporarily stable is theoretically feasible but practically impossible,
demolition might be the preferred option. Here the agent appointed by the mayor will be
valuable, as they will likely have access to information about the availability of supplies
and workers.

C. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MODIFIED PROCEDURE

Scarcity of time and resources is the primary hindrance to the normal functioning
of historic preservation statutes in times of emergency. The proposed procedure
addresses both of these concerns: filing requirements for applications for demolition are
relaxed, fewer people are required to review the applications, and the criteria by which
they judge the application is expanded to include the unique considerations resulting from
a disaster. Although this procedure represents a large departure from the process that
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operates under normal conditions and accordingly offers less protection to historic
structures, it is preferable to the complete elimination of all procedure that is possible
under statutes like the one in New Orleans. By conceding on some restrictions to reflect
the strained conditions present, preservationists will be better able to ensure that the
recovery process results in a community that has not lost one of its most valuable
assets—the buildings that form its identity and give its residents a sense of place.

CONCLUSION

This type of provision, dictating what protection buildings in historic districts
should receive in times of emergency, should be written into every community’s historic
preservation law. By devoting time and resources to make these decisions during normal,
peaceful times, communities can avoid the kind of confusion, frustration, and waste of
valuable resources during an emergency like what was seen in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina. The provision is also necessary in every community, not just those
having higher probability of natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes.
Disaster can strike at any time and can come in any form—from Mother Nature, from an
accident, or from attack. Addressing these concerns before the fact will ensure that
historic buildings receive the reasoned, thorough, and transparent treatment and
consideration that they deserve.
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